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sistent advocacy in the face of judicial resistance can produce unexpect-
ed rewards, and the Virginia capital defense bar should take note that
whether such claims are preserved or defaulted can often be a matter of
life or death for many capital defendants.




5 F.3d 758 (4th Cir. 1993)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Late in the evening on September 18 or early in the morning on
September 19, 1987, Timothy Wilson Spencer went to the home of
Debbie Dudley Davis. Spencer bound Davis's hands with shoestrings,
raped her and then strangled her to death with a "ligature and ratchet-
type" device, which he made out of a sock and vacuum cleaner hose.
Upon discovering the body, investigators found two hairs in the vic-
tim's pubic hair and determined that they were "consistent with"
Spencer's underarm hair. Investigators also found semen stains on the
victim's bedclothes. The presence of spermatozoa was further found
when vaginal and rectal swabs of the victim were taken. Forensic analy-
sis of the semen stains determined that the stains had been deposited by a
secretor whose blood characteristics matched those of only thirteen per-
cent of the North American population. Spencer's blood and saliva sam-
ples indicate that he is a member of that population group.
A semen sample from the victim's bedclothes and a sample of
Spencer's blood were subjected to DNA analysis. The analysis was per-
formed by Lifecodes, a private laboratory, which found that the DNA
molecules extracted from the semen stains matched the DNA molecules
extracted from Spencer's blood. Evidence presented at trial established
that the statistical likelihood of finding a duplication of Spencer's partic-
ular DNA pattern in the population of African Americans who live in
North America is only one in seven hundred five million. Further, the evi-
dence established that Spencer is one of only ten million black males liv-
ing in North America.
On September 22, 1988, a Richmond jury unanimously found
Spencer guilty of rape, burglary and capital murder, and sentenced him to
death. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the death sentence on
direct appeal. 1 Spencer next filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
state trial court, which was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Virginia
refused to grant his petition for appeal when Spencer failed by one day to
meet the time limit established by Rule 5:17(a)(1) of the Rules of the
1 Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989).
2 Rule 5:17(a)(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia
states:
Time for Filing. In every case in which the appellate jurisdic-
tion of this Court is invoked, a petition for appeal must be
filed with the Clerk of this Court:
(1) in the case of an appeal direct from a trial court, not more
than three months after entry of the order appealed from ....
Supreme Court of Virginia.2 Spencer filed a motion to extend the time for
filing that petition for appeal, but the Supreme Court of Virginia denied
the motion. Spencer next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The
district court denied his petition on the ground that Spencer had failed to
exhaust all available state remedies.
3
Next, Spencer filed an appeal with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Spencer based his appeal on the follow-
ing five grounds: (1) DNA evidence in this case is unreliable; (2) defense
counsel was denied an opportunity to adequately defend against the DNA
evidence because the trial court denied a discovery request for Lifecodes'
worknotes and memoranda, the trial court refused to provide funds for an
expert defense witness, and the prosecution did not reveal evidence of
problems with Lifecodes' testing methods; (3) the trial court should not
have admitted the DNA evidence; (4) the prosecution improperly struck
Miss Chrita Shelton from the jury for racially-motivated reasons as pro-
hibited by Batson v. Kentucky;4 and (5) the future dangerousness aggra-
vating factor in Virginia's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional-
ly vague.
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
many of Spencer's issues and claims were precluded from federal habeas
review because they were procedurally defaulted.
First, two claims were precluded because Spencer filed the state
habeas petition with the Supreme Court of Virginia one day past the
mandatory filing deadline set forth in Supreme Court of Virginia Rule
5:17(a)(1). 5 Those two claims alleged the unreliability of the DNA evi-
dence and that the defense could not adequately prepare because the trial
court did not provide a defense expert.
3 Spencer v. Murray, No. 3:91CV00391 (E.D. Va. April 30, 1992).
The petition was dismissed on the grounds that missing a filing deadline
does not count towards the exhaustion of state remedies, despite the fact
that the missed deadline renders it impossible for a defendant to further
avail himself of state remedies. As noted infra, failure to exhaust that is
occasioned by failure to follow state procedural rules is also procedural
default, which can bar consideration of the claims in federal court.
4 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5 Spencer v. Murray, No. 910055 (Va. March 18, 1991) (two docu-
ments).
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Second, the court ruled that Spencer's claim that the defense could
not adequately prepare because the trial court refused to grant his request
for discovery of Lifecodes' worknotes and memoranda was properly
raised on direct appeal. Still, the claim was held to be defaulted because
it was not raised again in the federal district court in Spencer's petition
for federal habeas relief.
6
Third, the court refused to consider Spencer's claim that the defense
could not adequately prepare because the prosecution and its expert
agent, Lifecodes, failed to disclose any problems with Lifecodes' testing
methods that they knew or should have known existed. The court held
this issue was defaulted because Spencer never raised it in any state
court.
7
The court also decided several issues on the merits. First, the court
held that the prosector provided a racially neutral reason for striking a
black juror, thus satisfying the Batson test. Second, the court ruled that
Spencer failed to meet the threshold test for his actual innocence claim.
8
Lastly, the court summarily considered and rejected Spencer's claim that
the future dangerousness aggravating factor has not been meaningfully
construed by the Supreme Court of Virginia, and thus the factor fails to
guide the jury's discretion during decisionmaking.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Many of the issues raised by Spencer I, including some that were
held to be defaulted, are of importance to Virginia defense attorneys.
They include: (I) the trial court's refusal to appoint a defense expert to
test the reliability of the DNA evidence; (2) the failure of the trial court
to order disclosure to the defense of Lifecodes' notes and memoranda that
explained the DNA testing procedures used in this case; (3) admissibility
of DNA evidence; (4) Batson claim based on the prosecutor's use of
peremptory strike on the basis that the prosecutor was concerned about
the educational and literacy level of a potential juror who had heard noth-
ing about the facts of the highly publicized case and nothing about DNA
testing; and (5) the Fourth Circuit's denial of Spencer's claims of actual
and/or factual innocence.
I. Denial of Defense DNA Expert
The court did consider and reject Spencer's claims that the DNA evi-
dence in his trial should not have been admitted. In doing so, it implicit-
6 Spencer v. Murray, No. 3:91CV00391 (E.D. Va. April, 30, 1992).
7 Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758, 762 (4th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Spencer 1].
8 Spencer's "actual innocence" claim was not a separate allegation
of error in itself, but was put forward as an excuse for default.
9 234 Va. 672, 364 S.E.2d 491, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
10 Spencer 1, 5 F.3d at 763 (quoting Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238
Va. at 314, 384 S.E.2d at 797).
I1 In a footnote, the court explained: "When Spencer's counsel
argued his motion for funds for an expert on August 2, 1988, the attor-
neys advised the court that 'the motion was filed merely to put the Court
on notice that we will be making the motion."' Spencer I, 5 F.3d at 760
n. 2.
However, the conversation between defense counsel and the court
that followed is extremely confusing at best. The judge, explaining what
kind of expert he would allow, seems to say that he would only approve
an expert who would actually aid the defense. Implicitly, the judge states
that he does not want to expend funds on an independent expert who may
ultimately agree with the prosecution that the DNA evidence is reliable in
this case. The relevant portion of the judge's remarks to defense counsel
is as follows:
ly decided a defaulted claim challenging the reliability of DNA evidence.
The court cited O'Dell v. Commonwealth9 for the proposition that
DNA evidence in general is considered reliable and thus admissible. The
Fourth Circuit found that Spencer failed to meet his burden of showing
that the DNA tests in this case were not reliable. Quoting the Supreme
Court of Virginia's opinion in Spencer's direct appeal, the court stated:
"The record is replete with uncontradicted expert testimony that no 'dis-
sent whatsoever [exists] in the scientific community' concerning the reli-
ability of the DNA printing technique. Unrebutted expert testimony fur-
ther established that the testing procedure performed in this case was
conducted in a reliable manner."10 Thus, any attacks of unreliability
against DNA evidence must be specifically directed at the methodology
used in performing these particular tests.
It is difficult to discern from the court's opinion whether the defense
attorney actually requested a DNA expert, or whether he merely suggest-
ed to the judge that he might want an expert at some unspecified time in
the future.11 If there was an actual request by defense counsel, it is prob-
lematic that the judge would not appoint an expert unless defense coun-
sel could demonstrate prior to the appointment that the testimony of the
expert would be helpful to the defense.
In Ake v. Oklahoma,12 the United States Supreme Court held that
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process entitles an indigent capital defen-
dant to an expert(s) if the defendant makes a preliminary showing that the
issue for which the expert is needed is likely to be a significant factor at
trial. Spencer clearly passed this threshold test, as all of Spencer's claims
of error (except for the Batson claim) depend upon the admissibility of
the DNA evidence and thus whether these particular tests were conduct-
ed correctly. When making an Ake motion, defense counsel must make a
qualified showing of the type of expert she wants (i.e., DNA expert) and
should disclose the type of work the expert will do. But Ake does not
require that defense counsel must first specify the conclusions made by
the expert before the court may appropriate funds to obtain that expert. In
fact, the purpose of Ake is that the defendant does not merely have to take
the Commonwealth's assertions as true. Instead, the defendant is entitled
to a "second opinion" regarding the correctness of the Commonwealth's
evidence, provided that the evidence is of sufficient importance to the
case.
Neither does Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 3A: 11 on discovery
require that defense counsel ascertain the expert's opinions and conclu-
sions before asking the court to foot the bill. Instead, Rule 3A: 11 implic-
I want to know what the experts are going to say before I
appropriate funds.
If you have got somebody to say, an expert, DNA is not a reli-
able test, I would think that would be a proper issue for the
jury to believe, which is what you want ....
So when you come in, get your expert, what his credentials
are to become an expert. [Y]ou will certainly talk to him, what
he is going to say or what he can possibly say. We can find
that out.
I have so many experts. I believe there is a handwriting
expert. It was supposed to be out in the west. The lady at the
trial delayed the trial for three months, sent it out west and
came back and said he [expert] would testify to the one thing
before trial. And he eventually said, the State expert is exact-
ly right. I agree with him 100 percent. That's what I am talk-
ing about.
When you get that, you let me know.
Id. at 761 n.2.
12 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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itly enables the defendant to acquire an independent expert regardless of
his professional finding. This inference is based on the language of the
Rule, which provides that experts' opinions must be disclosed to the pros-
ecution only in the event that the defense intends to introduce the findings
into evidence at the trial or sentencing. Rule 3A: 11 (c), "Discovery by the
Commonwealth", provides in relevant part:
If the court grants relief sought by the accused ... under...
this Rule, it shall, upon motion of the Commonwealth, condi-
tion its order by requiring that:
(1) The accused shall permit the Commonwealth within a rea-
sonable time but not less than ten (10) days before trial or sen-
tencing, as the case may be, to inspect, copy or photograph
any written reports or autopsy examinations, ballistic tests,
fingerprint, blood, urine and breath analyses, and other scien-
tific tests that may be within the accused's possession, cus-
tody or control and which the defense intends to proffer or
introduce into evidence at trial or sentencing.
(emphasis added). Thus, according to the Rule, a defendant may use an
expert who will make an independent determination about the test results.
If the expert ultimately agrees with the prosecution expert, the remedy for
the defense is to forego calling that expert as a defense witness. In such a
situation, the Commonwealth is not entitled to discover the expert's opin-
ion. The concerns of Ake will have been met, however, as the evidence
will have been tested in the manner envisioned by Due Process.
II. Denial of Discovery of Lifecodes' Worknotes and
Memoranda
Spencer's most important claim focused on the court's denial of his
discovery request for Lifecodes' worknotes and memoranda. Its impor-
tance lies in the fact that all of Spencer's other claims (excepting the
Batson issue) are inextricably tied to this one. As mentioned above, the
effect of the O'Dell opinion has been that defendants may only attack
reliability of particularized DNA tests. Thus, Spencer needed access to
13 Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). See also case
summary of Coleman, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 4 (1991);
Smith v. Dixon, 14 F. 3d 956 (4th Cir. 1994), and case summary of Smith,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue; Condrey v. Childress, 203 Va. 755,
127 S.E.2d 150 (1962).
14 Tharp v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 1, 175 S.E.2d 277 (1970).
15 Spencer 1, 5 F.3d at 763.
16 See, e.g., Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 393 S.E.2d 599
(1990) and case summary of Cheng, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No.
1, p. 20 (1990); Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 433, 389 S.E.2d 886
(1990) and case summary of Mu'Min, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3,
No. 1, p. 17 (1990); Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 377 S.E.2d
595 (1989) and case summary of Hoke, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2,
No. 1, p. 18 (1989); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d
196 (1987).
17 See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); see also case
summary of Coleman, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 4 (1991);
Justus v. Murray, 897 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1990) and case summary of
Justus, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 14 (1990).
18 211 Va. 91, 175 S.E.2d 271 (1970).
19 Id. at 95, 175 S.E.2d at 274. For a summary of state habeas law
in Virginia prior to the Spencer I ruling, see Hobart, State Habeas in
Virginia: A Critical Transition, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p.
23 (1990).
the worknotes as those notes were the only records detailing the method-
ology used in conducting the tests.
Spencer included this issue in his petition for state habeas relief filed
with the Supreme Court of Virginia. Unfortunately, that court refused to
hear the petition on the ground that Spencer missed the filing deadline by
one day. Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 5:17(a)(1) provides a three
month deadline for filing after entry of an order from the trial court. This
deadline is mandatory and cannot be waived, regardless of the justice of
turning the claims down on the merits. 13 A motion to extend the filing
deadline will be entertained only if the court finds that to deny the exten-
sion in a particular case would abridge a Constitutional right. 14 As noted
above, the Spencer I court decided that no such error occurred here.
15
In its discussion of the need to preserve claims for habeas review,
the Fourth Circuit clarified a precedent on a matter which could prove to
be immensely helpful to Virginia defense attorneys. The Commonwealth
enforces its default rules rigorously. 16 Federal habeas courts, relying on
the principles of comity and federalism, refuse to hear defaulted claims
on their merits. 17 Prior to the Spencer I decision, capital petitioners have
proceeded very cautiously, presenting claims in state habeas that had
been rejected on the merits by the Supreme Court of Virginia on direct
appeal. At state habeas the court consistently relied on Hawks v. Cox
18
and ruled that it was precluded from hearing those issues and granting
relief. Hawks held that a "previous determination of the issues by either
state or federal courts will be conclusive."
19
The Spencer I court, however, made it clear that claims presented to
the Supreme Court of Virginia and rejected on direct appeal were still
procedurally eligible to be considered on the merits by federal habeas
courts. Quoting Grundler v. North Carolina,20 the court stated : "If a
question is presented and adjudicated by the state's highest court once, it
is not necessary to urge it upon them a second time under an alternate pro-
cedure." 21 Thus, the Spencer I court indicates that the Hawks argument
taken by the Attorney General (i.e., that no state habeas relief is available
on claims previously rejected on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of
Virginia) is still valid. Therefore, bypassing state habeas has several dis-
tinct advantages: First, any further findings of fact necessary to the claim
will be made by the federal court, as opposed to the circuit court at state
habeas. At least to those facts then, there is not the problem of the
requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)22 that the federal court defer to
20 283 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1960).
21 Id. at 800.
22 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) states, in relevant part:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus.., evidenced by a written
finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate writ-
ten indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the appli-
cant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the
respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in
the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at
the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter or over the person of the applicant in the State court pro-
ceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in
deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint coun-
sel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate
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state court findings of fact.23 Second, the common assertion by the
Commonwealth that the claim is defaulted because it is not the same
claim that was rejected on direct appeal will be decided initially by the
federal court, rather than by a state court that often has a vested interest
in preserving the trial results.24 Needless to say, however, before bypass-
ing state habeas, defense counsel should ensure that the claim is indeed
protected by the holdings of Spencer I and Grundler.
III. Admissibility of DNA Evidence
Spencer listed seven problems that may have occurred during the
DNA analysis performed in his case.25 First, he claimed that bandshift-
ing of the DNA may have occurred because the restriction fragments of
the DNA were placed on different slabs of gel which may have performed
differently during electrolysis. Second, because Lifecodes failed to record
the voltage used during gel electrophoresis, it is impossible to verify the
accuracy of the results. A shift would cause the DNA fragments to move
farther or less than their true length would normally move under ideal
conditions. Third, two of Spencer's claims centered around the possibili-
ty that environmental contaminants or cross-contaminants may have
affected the DNA and skewed the test results. Fourth, he argued that
because DNA analysis technology is relatively new, there are no avail-
able data as to the reliability of testing on forensic samples that have
degraded over the passage of time. Fifth, Lifecodes used a visual com-
parison for pattern similarity in the DNA samples based on mere subjec-
tive opinion rather than objective analysis. Sixth, Spencer claimed that
test results could have been skewed through the use of Lifecodes' various
probes. Other claims dealt with misleading the jury with statistics about
the reliability of the results and the probability of finding someone else
with the same DNA makeup, and the lack of standards and licensure
requirements covering the labs.
hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of
law in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court pro-
ceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was
made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support such factual determination, is produced
as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a con-
sideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes
that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record ....
23 For an interesting example of refusal to honor state court
factfinding when doing so would aid a capital petitioner, see case sum-
mary of Burden v. Zant, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
24 It is essential that the claim presented to the federal courts is the
same one rejected by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Evidence of this is
found in the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Edmonds v. Thompson,
1994 WL 47745 (4th Cir. (Va.)) (unpublished). In Edmonds, the trial
court failed to order a presentence report prior to entering judgment on
the sentence. On federal habeas, the federal district court vacated the
death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing. The same judge
who had sentenced Edmonds to death presided over the new sentencing
hearing, and defense counsel failed to request recusal of the judge. Once
again, the court sentenced Edmonds to death.
At state habeas, Edmonds made the same claim with regard to inef-
fective assistance of counsel that he had made on direct appeal. He
argued that counsel had failed to object to the content of the trial court's
final sentencing order, which had held the Commonwealth to a lower
burden of proof than mandated by the death penalty statute, and had also
failed to find the essential elements of the future dangerous aggravating
Due to the importance of these issues and the fact that courts gener-
ally admit DNA evidence as reliable, it is essential for defense attorneys
to request independent DNA experts who can verify or refute the results
of these tests. Discovering and presenting any errors in the tests done- is
crucial during trial, direct appeal and state habeas. Due to the principle of
comity, federal courts are reluctant to reconsider issues concerning the
admissibility of evidence. Quoting Grundler, the Spencer I court reiterat-
ed:
Normally, the admissibility of evidence, the sufficiency of
evidence, and instructions to the jury in state trials are matters
of state law and procedure not involving federal constitution-
al issues. It is only in circumstances impugning fundamental
fairness or infringing specific constitutional protections that a
federal question is presented. The role of a federal habeas cor-
pus petition is not to serve as an additional appeal.
26
IV. Batson v. Kentucky Issue
The Fourth Circuit held that Spencer's claim based on Batson v.
Kentucky27 was not defaulted as it had been raised on direct appeal to the
Supreme Court of Virginia. The Batson Court held that in order for a
defendant to make a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination
during jury selection, he must demonstrate two things: (1) the defendant
is a member of a cognizable racial group and (2) the prosecution has used
peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant's race from
the venire. On this showing, aprimafacie case is made that the prosecu-
tor sought to exclude the venire members from the jury solely because of
race. Then, the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate a satisfactory
race-neutral reason for the strike.
factor. At federal habeas, the district court liberally construed Edmonds'
claim, finding inherent within it the claim that defense counsel were
ineffective because they failed to request recusal of the judge. At an evi-
dentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel, a magistrate judge
found that counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and that but
for counsel's unprofessional error, there was a reasonable probability
that Edmonds would not have been sentenced to death.
On appeal by the warden, the Fourth Circuit held that it could not
grant habeas relief to the defendant because the district court had grant-
ed relief solely on a claim that had not been raised by Edmonds. The
court held:
The plain, reasonable, and, indeed, only meaning of
Edmonds' claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the content of the sentencing order. To perceive in
it a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
recuse the trial judge is to force Edmonds' words to bear
more meaning than they are capable of bearing.
1994 WL 47745 at *2. The Fourth Circuit reinstated the death penalty.
Edmonds illustrates that every claim on every ground should be
raised on appeal. Claims should not be "winnowed" for presentation of
only the strong ones to the Supreme Court of Virginia. See case sum-
mary of Smith v. Dixon, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
25 Spencer 1, 5 F.3d at 765 n.5. For a thorough explanation of DNA
analysis and the procedures used, see Lonsbury, The Current State of
DNA Evidence, Capital Defense Digest, Vol, 4, No. 2, p. 11 (1992).
26 Spencer 1, 5 F. 3d. at 762 (quoting Grundler v. North Carolina,
283 F.2d at 802).
27 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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All Batson explicitly prohibits is the use of racially motivated
peremptory strikes. Thus any other reasons, however reprehensible, for
excluding venire members are legally permissible. In Spencer's case the
prosecutor successfully justified his use of a peremptory challenge to
strike a black woman, Chrita Shelton, by stating:
Quite frankly, I am concerned about the literacy and the edu-
cational level of someone who has not heard anything about
either DNA, or anything about the Southside Strangler, or
Timothy Spencer by now in this jurisdiction. The publicity
has been extensive, and I am afraid if you heard nothing, as
she indicated, she is not an informed citizen. So I did not want
that type of individual on the jury.
2 8
However, when a Batson issue arises, there is more for defense
counsel to do than simply evaluate and contest on its face the explanation
given by the Commonwealth. Defense attorneys may determine whether
there was any disparate treatment in the voir dire questioning or exercise
of strikes of white versus black venire members. For example, defense
counsel could have considered whether white jurors were examined to the
same extent regarding pre-trial publicity, and whether white jurors who
had not heard of the Southside Strangler were struck as well.
Case law in other jurisdictions supports the notion that disparate
treatment falls within the Batson prohibition, despite the facially neutral
reason given by the prosecutor for exercising a peremptory challenge. A
very useful case supporting this proposition is Wiese v. State,29 in which
the Texas Court of Appeals held that questioning of one excluded black
juror in a manner different than the questioning of white jurors estab-
lished that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of offering a sat-
isfactory race-neutral reason for exercising the peremptory challenge.
V. Actual Innocence
Spencer raised the issue that his claims concerning the problems
with the reliability of the DNA evidence should not be procedurally
barred on the basis that such evidence is relevant to the consideration of
Spencer's actual innocence. 30 Spencer claimed that but for the DNA evi-
dence, the Commonwealth would have been unable to convict him.
Spencer further argued that because of the potential errors he raised with
respect to the methodology of the testing in this case, the DNA tests were
flawed and he is "actually innocent."
The Fourth Circuit denied Spencer's claims on the basis that
Spencer failed to meet the extremely high requisite showing required for
an actual innocence claim. The court said that Spencer's claim was real-
ly one of "factual innocence," i.e. that the DNA tests were flawed and that
he was wrongly convicted. Further, the court stated that Spencer's
28 Spencer 1, 5 F.3d at 764. Thus, the fact that the juror had not been
exposed to prejudicial pre-trial publicity was an adequate basis for a
peremptory strike.
29 811 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
30 Spencer 1, 5 F.3d at 765.
31 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). See case summary of Herrera, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 4 (1993).
32 Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860. The Herrera court reserved only the
small possibility that evidence of innocence could be so strong (such as
a videotape of someone else committing the crime) that courts, rather
than the governor in clemency, would have to consider it.
reliance on rulings from other cases and courts and articles from law
review and scientific journals did not constitute "newly discovered evi-
dence" that could be considered on a habeas appeal. Even if the evidence
was "newly discovered," Spencer did not raise a separate federal consti-
tutional issue.
To succeed in making an actual innocence claim, a defendant must
meet the stringent test set forth in Herrera v. Collins.3 1 In rejecting
Spencer's claims, the Fourth Circuit quoted Herrera: "Claims of actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to
state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitu-
tional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding."
32
The Fourth Circuit likewise ruled that Spencer had failed to meet the
requirements of the "innocent of the death penalty" exception of Sawyer
v. Whitley.33 The Sawyer Court created an avenue for defendants by
which they could have an otherwise defaulted claim considered on the
merits. A claim will be considered once a defendant has shown, "by clear
and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable
juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under
the applicable state law.
' 34
Asserting the Sawyer test, Spencer unsuccessfully argued that the
court should consider his defaulted claims that he was denied an oppor-
tunity adequately to defend against the DNA evidence by virtue of the
fact that (1) the trial court refused to order the discovery of Lifecodes'
worknotes and memoranda; (2) the trial court refused to provide neces-
sary funds for a defense expert; and (3) the prosecution did not provide
the defense with evidence of any problems with the DNA testing meth-
ods. However, to prevail, Spencer would have had to demonstrate that the
particular DNA results obtained in this case were wrong, and that but for
those improper results no reasonable juror would have found him eligible
for death.
35
Spencer's failure to make the required showing of actual innocence
ties in with his other claims on appeal. The sufficiency of Spencer's actu-
al innocence arguments was affected by his failure to successfully obtain
evidence of the methodology used by Lifecodes. His actual innocence
claims were also affected by the court's acceptance that the tests were
done correctly. In response to Spencer's claims that the DNA tests in this
case were performed incorrectly, the Fourth Circuit stated: "After a
review of the same record, we think the decisions of the state courts are
not only free from constitutional error under the due process clause, no
error at all has come to our attention."
36
Thus, the failure of the trial court to order discovery of Lifecodes'
worknotes and memoranda served as the basis for Spencer's failure to
adequately defend against the DNA evidence. It is essential for defense
attorneys in Virginia to seek this information, and to request an indepen-
dent defense expert who can serve as a check upon the testing methodol-
ogy used by the prosecution experts.
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33 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). See case summary of Sawyer, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 18 (1992).
34 Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2515. For example, to satisfy the "innocence
of the death penalty" standard, a defendant would have to show that the
defendant did not commit the crime, or that there was no reasonable evi-
dence of the aggravating factor necessary for a death sentence.
35 Of course, Sawyer also applies to innocence of the offense, in the
sense that one who did not commit the crime is not eligible for the death
penalty. See case summary of Spencer v. Murray (Spencer 11), Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
36 Spencer 1, 5 F.3d at 763.
